I. R. Stringham, et al. v. Salt Lake City : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1948
I. R. Stringham, et al. v. Salt Lake City : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richards and Bird; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Stringham et al v. Salt Lake City, No. 7162 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/838
. Supreme (:ourt 
' , ' I, \ ! 
OF THE.,.\ 
,\ ' !( 
State of~ Utah\, 
~ 
I 
) 
'I. j' 
i 
I 
!. R. 's_;.rlt~.·.~~GHAM, e~ aL;, \ . 
' '. ' 1\ ' ) 
-) \_ ' '-\ / ,' 
·. -vs .... · 
t 
' : t 
I I \Arrpellan~t.$, 
I / .\I 
I I 
'\ 
I 
.,· 'I 
(,. ,I 
I' I 
. /',, : ·1, 1 
I, 
\ ' : c 
I )., 
; ( 
·1 \ 
•f I ' \ 
' ,,: I 'i 
,;··,_ ,-,:--jf_, ; --,I 
\"·,'··/~1,'-:-•:,· 
, ·. \ I : 1. 
: i" \ \' [' \ 
', 1·, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
... ~RGUMENT .................................................................................................. 2 
I. The Court erred in stating and holding that Section 
15-8-26, U.C.A., 1943, gives authority for regulation of 
signs such as those involved in this proceeding, Section 
15-8-23 being the section under which signs must be regulated.. 2 
II. The Court erred in holding that no aspect of unreaJson-
ableness or arbitrary or capricious ·action appears from 
the pleadings herein, which specifically allege that the-re 
are no grounds or reasons for classifying the signs of 
the appellant's on a reasonable or logncal basi1s or on 
a fa.ctual basis ...................................................................................... 6 
III. Now here does the opinion of this Court give any rea-
son or indic·ate any basis for an alleged classification 
made by Salt Lake City which can be upheld by this Court...... 7 
CO·NCLU SI ON ------------------------------------------------------------------------·-----------·········· 8 
·Cases and Authorities Cited 
Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 2 Atl. 2d. 842 ---------------------------------------- 8 
French v. Cooper, 34 Atl. 2d. 880 -------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Fuhr v. Oklahoma City, et al., 153 P. 2d. 115 ------------------------------------------ 5 
LaPage v. United States, 146 F. 2d. 536 -------------------------------------------------- 5 
Laura Vincent Co. v. City of Selma, 11 P. 2d. 17 ------------------------------------ 8 
People ex rel. Schimpff v. Norvell, 13 N .E. 2d. 960 ................................ 8 
Pickrell v. Carlisle, 121 S.W. 1029 ------------------------------------------------··-····-----·- 8 
Western ReaUy Co. v. City of Reno, et ·al., 172 P. 2d. 158 -------------------- 5 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sedtion 15-8-23 ----------------------------------------3, 4 
Utah Gode Annotated, 1943, Section 1,5-8-26 -----------·········-··············------- 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
I. R. STRINGHAM, et al., 
Appellants, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation 
Respondent. 
PETITION 
FOR 
REHEARING 
Case No. 7162 
The appellants respectfully petition for a rehearing 
In this cause based upon the following errors in the 
decision of the court dated January 17, 1949. 
1. The court erred in stating and holding that 
Section 15-8-26, U.C.A., 1943, gives authority for regula-
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2 
tion of signs such as those involved in this proceeding, 
Section 15-8-23 being the section under "\vhich signs must 
be regulated. 
2. The Court eTred in _holding that no aspect of 
unreasonableness or abritrary or capricious action ap-
'pears from the pleadings herein, which specifically allege 
that there are no grounds· or reasons for classifying the 
signs of the appellants on a reasonable or logical basis 
or on a factual basis. 
3. N O\vhere does the opinion of this court give any 
reason or indicate any basis for an alleged classification 
m.ade by Salt Lake City which can be upheld by this 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TIIE COURT ERRED IN STATING AND HOLDING 
THAT SECTION. 15-8-26, U.C.A., 1943, GIVES AUTH-
ORITY FOR REGULATION OF SIGNS SUCH AS THOSE 
INVOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING, SECTION 15-8-23 
BErNG TIIE SECTION UNDER \VHICH SIGNS MUST 
BE REGULATED. 
Unde-r point 3 of its opinion the court refers to the 
statutory authority for regulating use of the streets 
and makes this stateraent: 
''It is under these Code sections that the 
City seeks to control the use of the streets and 
pass such an oTdinahce as Section 5720. There 
are, by the Code several classes of structures: 
rr-hose covered by Sec. 15-8-26, include signs and 
signposts snch as are involved here, as distin-
guished frorn overhead signs covered by Sec. 
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3 
13-8-23, and incidentally by Sec. 5731 of the City 
Ordinances. The c lassifiea tion is one seleeted by 
the legislature.'' 
Section 13-8-::?:i specifically relates to signs and signposts. 
In face of this specific statement of legislative policy, 
it is beyond the authority of Salt Lake ·City to regulate 
signs under another section of the statute which deals 
"'ith obstructions. 
Statutory language should he given its ordinary 
meaning if that is plain or reasonable. Nothing in the 
statutes suggests that signs can be obstructions rather 
than signs and therefore be regulated under Section 
15-8-23 rather than 15-8-26. Section 26 provides as to 
cities: 
"Signs and Advertising }/[atter. They may 
regulate or p~revent the use of streets, sidewalks, 
public buildings and grounds for signs, signposts, 
avvnings, horse troughs or racks, or for posting 
handbills or advertisements.'' 
Nothing in this language restricts this section to over-
hanging signs or to signs above the streets or otherwise. 
This is the section under which the signs of appellants 
should be either regulated or prevented upon a classifi-
cation which is reasonable. 
Section 15-8-23 plainly does not authorize the city to 
regulate these signs in the face of Sectjon 26 vvhirh 
deals specifically with that subject matter. In fac:t, 
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Section 23 does not cover the problern at hand. The sec-
tion reads as follows: 
''Cleaning Property, Streets and Sidewalks. 
They may regulate and control the UHe of side-
walks and all structures thereunder or thereover; 
and they may require the owner or occupant, or 
the agent of any owner or occupant, of p~roperty 
to remove all weeds and noxious vegetation from 
such property, and in front thereof to the curb 
line of the street, and to keep the sidewalks in 
front of such property free from litter, snow, 
ice and obstructions." 
The first clause relates to use of sidewalks and 
structures thereunder or thereover. The signs of the 
appellants are in the parking area and not in the side-
walk area. The next clause deals '\\ri th the area from the 
front of an o"'rner's property to the curb line o.f the 
street, which covers the area where appellants' signs are 
located, but this authority is restricted to removal of 
'·all \Veeds and noxious vegetation'' \Vhich these signs 
plainly are not. The last clause again relates to side-
\valks only and permits the city to regulate them so 
as to keep them ','free from litter, snovv, ice and obstruc-
tions." To classify the signs of appeHants as obstructions 
to the sidewalks and torture the ordinance to come under 
Section 15-8-23 is simply to ignore the plain provisions of 
Section 15-8-26. 
An_other rule of statutory interpretation requires 
that sections of related laws eac:h be given full force and 
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effect 'vhere that is possible. La Page v. United States, 
(CCA-8 1945) 146 F. 2d 536, 156 A.L.R. 965; Western 
Realty Co. v. City of Reno, .et al., (Nev. 1946) 172 P. 2d 
13S, 161: Fuhr v. Oklahon1a City, et al., 194 Okla. 482, 
153 P.2d 115, 117-118; 50 Am. Jur. 371-372. 
This position is given importance through a con-
sideration of the ordinances of ~Salt Lake City. Section 
5720 originally classified as structures a.ll of the signs 
involved in this proceeding although they were located 
in the parking, and such signs were not p·rohibited but 
'vere regulated. \Vithout any change in the facts (for 
such are the allegations of the com1plaint), the city at-
tempted to amend the ordinance and classify signs as 
obstructions and prohibit them. If these signs were reg-
ulated under Section 15-8-23 along with other signs, in, 
on, over, or about the streets of Salt Lake City there 
would have to be a basis for classification. Appellants 
ask no more. We allege arbitrary and discriminatory 
action by Salt Lake City which is not denied hut is in 
effect admitted by the demurrer. Ap.pellants are entitled 
to a trial in this case so that the coui't can hear 'vha t 
reason or lack of reason Salt Lake City will advance for 
its allegedly arbitrary action in this matter, and if the 
reason given can be accepted by reasonable p·ersons as a 
basis for classification or distinction, then the action of 
the city should stand. Appellants respectfully urge that 
neither Sa.lt Lake City nor this Court has pointed out 
a basis for the so-called classification made by the city. 
Ancl, what is more to the point, appellants believe no 
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6 
legally sufficient basis can he advanced if the Court will 
recognize that this involves a regulation of signs and not 
the removal of obstructions. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO ASPECT 
OF UNREASONABLENESS OR ARBITRARY OR CAP-
RICIOUS ACTION APPEARS F·RO·M THE PLEADINGS 
HEREIN, WHICH SPECIFICALLY. ALLE·GE THAT 
THERE ARE NO GROUNDS OR REASONS FOR CLASS-
IFYING rHE SIGNS OF THE APPELLANTS ON A 
REASONABLE OR LOGICAL BASIS OR ON A FACT-
UAL BASIS. 
Under point 3 the Court says: 
"We again call attention to the fact that the 
order in the case before us was to remove all 
signs from city parking, therefore no aspect of 
unreasonableness appears from any arbitrary 
or capricious action directed against some and 
not all owners of similar signs. The element of 
unreasonableness, if any, here involved is that 
claimed by the appellants by virtue of their alle-
gations in their complaint that certain facts which 
might authorize and justify the removal of their 
class of signs do not exist." 
Appellants allege in their complaint that no logical 
basis for classification exists and that none of the legiti-
mate objectives of city government will he furthered by 
the action in question. The · com~plaint also alleges in 
paragraph 11 (a) a number of uses, structures, and ob-
structions which are not prohibited by the ordinances 
of Salt I.1ake City, including overhanging signs in the 
congested portion of Salt I..1ake City which are not at-
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I 
tached to any buildings. Such signs are not distinguish-
able from the signs of the appellants on any logical hasis~ . 
... -\nd in paragraph 19 the complaint alleges that Salt Lake 
City is acting arbitrarily and capriciously by compelling 
the removal of the signs of the appellants and not the 
removal of other signs "\vhich c-annot be distinguished 
from the signs of the app~ellants on any reasonable basis. 
III. N"O\VHERE DOES THE OPINION O·F THIS COURT 
GIVE ANY REASON OR INDICATE ANY BASIS F·OR 
_.t\.N ... t\LLEGED CLA·SSIFICA.TIO·N lVIADE BY SALT 
LAKE CITY \VHICH CAN BE UPHELD BY THIS 
COURT. 
If it is not necessary for Salt Lake City to support 
its action in this case by a reas-onable classification or 
hy action based upon reason, then appellants respect-
fully sub:mit that this Court should say so and let the 
matter end there. The opinion of the C.ourt discusses 
unreasonableness and classification and action in the 
best interests of Salt Lake City vvithout onere stating 
what the reason is, how the classification can be sup-
ported, or what interest of Salt Lake City can con-
ceivahly be furthered by the action of the respondent. 
The Court exp-resses the opinion that Salt Lake City 
will not act arbitrarily and also suggests that the ci~-y 
should draw the line in the almost innumerable uses 
that are being made of the public streets in Salt. Lake 
·City. A reading of the opinion impells the conclusion 
that arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory act]on • 
i~ not to hr pern1itted by this IIonorable Court. If 
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Salt Lake City can act arbitrarily with reference 
to signs, then appellants submit that the complaint in 
this case alleges such arbi tary action. 
T~e following cases cited in our original brief hold 
that cities cannot act arb[trarily and capriciously in 
the matter of regulating streets~ Pickrell v. Carlis1e, 
135 Ky. 128, 131, 121 S. W. 1029; French v. Cooper, 
(1945) 133 N.J.L. 246, 34 Atl. 2d 880; Laura Vincent 
Co. v. Citry of Selma, 43 Cal. App. 473, 11 P. 2d 17; 
Breinig v. 'County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 482, 483, 
2 Atl. 2d 842, 848, 849; People ex rel. Schimpff v. Nor-
veil, 368 Ill. 325, 13 N.E. 2d 960, 961; 37 Am. J ur. 778. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that if the court 
will re-examine its opinion critically it will conclude 
that the opinion written is not satisfactory. The opinion 
places the regulatory po,ver of Salt Lake City under 
the wrong statute and erroneously gets into a regu-
lation on obstructions rather than a regulation on signs. 
Of course, obstructions c.an he removed and the com-
plaint alleges plainly that the signs are not obstruc-
tions. If the Court will further consider whether Salt 
I ~ake City must act reasonably in the premises, this 
Court will find that no such basis for classification 
or discriminatory action appears in the Court's opinion 
and such basis is denied in the allegations. of the com-
plaint. The Court should grant. _a rehearing and upon 
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~) 
rehearing should rPver~e the judg1nent of the dish·i<'t 
court and require Salt Lake City to answer the alle-
gations of discrin1ination and arbitrary and capricious 
action so that this Court can ultimately determine 
w·hether Salt Lake City has been acting and is threat-
ening no'v to act arbitrarily, cwpriciously and in a dis-
criminatory manner in the matters which affect appel-
lants. 
RICHARDS and BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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